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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~~~------------~--------------------~-----------
JACK E. BLANKENSHIP, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ZANE CHRISTENSEN, FLORA CHRISTENSEN, 
CALVIN J. JENSEN, LORNA JENSEN, 
JESS W. CHRISTENSEN, BEATRICE 
CHRISTENSEN, PAUL CHRISTENSEN, LEAH 
CHRISTENSEN, MILES H. CHRISTENSEN, 
DORIS ·c'H.RISTENSEN, EVA JANE ROWLEY, 
and DEE E. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants-Respondents.) 
REPLY B~IEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 16770 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintif f-Appe~lant brought this action to quiet title and 
to assert ~n ownership interest in and to certain prope~ties and 
mineral '· rights located in Duchesne County''" State of Utah. 
Defendants defended on the basis th~t 2l~intif f had no legal or 
equitable interest in the land. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock held that plaintiff, as assignee 
of a claimed interest from Enid Christensen Kolarich (hereafter 
Enid), received nothing by way of Eni·d' s quit claim deed to 
plaintiff, and that Enid had been fully sati·s·fi'ed as to any claim 
she had in the estate of Marion H. Christensen, deceased, 
'1<1' herea'fter referred~:· to as. decedent, prior to the time of her 
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conveyance to the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the lower court's ruling affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants believe the Statement of Facts filed by the 
Plaintiff to be too brief and sketchy. Defendants submit the 
following as a statement of the facts that are in keeping with 
the expressed Findings of the Court. 
On or about October 23, 1968, decedent, who was either the 
father or father-in-law of all of the defendants, died testate in 
Duchesne County, State of Utah. On July 7, 1969, the District 
Court of Duchesne County ordered the approval of the petition of 
the executor of the estate of decedent and authorized the 
distribution of the assets to the heirs. Because one of the 
natural children of decedent was also deceased, as a matter of 
convenience, the issue of said deceased child received their 
portion of the estate in cash, and decedent's real and mineral 
property was ordered to be distributed so that the living 
children of the decedent each received an undivided one-seventh 
(1/7) interest in the remainder. 
At the trial the decedent's executor testified that the 
heirs had, prior to July 1, 1969, decided as to what portion of 
the real and mineral property each of them would receive. For 
reasons not introduced at the trial, the writte~ order approving 
- 2 -
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the executor's petition was not signed until August 1, 1969, and 
was not filed with the clerk of the court.trntil August 4, 1969. 
Both on an d"i, prior to Ju 1 y 2 2 , 1969, the defendant Dee 
Christensen and his then wife, Enid, were residing in Evanston, 
Wyoming. On July 2 2, 196 9, the fol lowing even ts occurred: 
1. Enid secured an "assignment" from the 
defendant Dee' Christensen of his interest in the estate 
o f de c e dent • ( S·e e Ex h i bit P - 2 , Pg • 2 } • 
2. Enid filed a petition to have the defendant 
De e Ch r i s t en s en , in v o 1 u n t a r i _!y -~.9_!!l_El2:_ t t ~-<:! t a. the Wyo mi n g 
State Mental Hospital at Evanston, Wyoming, because of 
alcoholism. In the Order of Involuntary Commitment, 
the court found that the defendant "Dee E. Christensen 
is mentally ill, and. because of his illness, is likely 
to injure himself· or others. • , and because of his 
i 11 n es.s , -~ ac ks .s u f~J- c !~Et E.?..£.~_£_!_!:_:'( to ,!!!~~-~ £.~~.Eons i b 1 J=:_ 
-~~_9-~si.o_!l~· •1 ;;"~ '" (emphasis added} (see Exhibit P-5}. 
3. Enid secured a decree of divorce from the 
defendant Dee Christensen. 
On or about August 1, 1969, En id caused a "Notice of 
Inter e st " to be' . ;;:.. f i 1 e d with the C 1 erk·: of the tr i a 1 court in 
Probate 1209. No ~opy of said "Notice of Interest" or of the 
July 22, "Assignment" was sent or alleged to have been sent to 
either the executor or any of the other heirs. Likewise, it was 
not alleged or suggested'. that either Enid or her assignee, the 
plaintiff, ever attempted to seek- or to_ compel.._ the executor to 
comply with the terms of said alleged assignment. 
About the middle of August, 1969, Dee Christensen did 
"leave" the Wyoming State Mental Hospital at Evanston, Wyoming. 
On or about November 2 1 I 1969, Enid did cause a Notice of 
Interest to be recorded with the Duchesne County Recorder. (See 
Exhibit P-2). 
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During 1970 the seven living children of the decedent, 
including the defendant Dee Christensen, did execute and exchange 
deeds between themselves whereby each did receive what they had 
agreed prior to July 1, 1969, to be their one-seventh (1/7) share 
of the estate of their father. Said deeds were duly recorded in 
the office of the Duchesne County Recorder. To this point, 
ieither the heirs nor the executor of decedent's estate had been 
given any notice, written or verbal, of the claim of Enid, and no 
actions had been taken in the probate file of decedent, to alter, 
modify, amend or change the terms of the Decree of Distribution. 
In that partitionment of the decedent's real and mineral 
;iroperties, Dee Christensen received- 80 acres as his full share 
of the estate 
In Ma r ch or Apr i 1 , 1 9 7 1 , Ju d g e Davi d Sam and hi s brothers 
elected to purchase the 80 acres that had been deeded to Dee 
Christensen. At that time Judge Sam contacted Enid, who, by then 
was the former wife of said Dee Christensen, relative to her 
claimed interest in said estate. Enid requested $5,000.00. of 
d S for he r share of or claim to decedent's estate. (See Ju ge am, 
deposition of Judge Sam, [T.85): Pg.6, line 23 thru Pg.7, line 2; 
Pg.8, lines 5-19; and Pg.13, lines 9-12.) It is to be noted that 
Judge Sam testified that he understood said $5,000.00 was to be 
l·n full for any interest or claim of Enid in and to Dee payment 
' share of the estate of his father. Christensen s Judge Sam, who 
was 
acquainted with Enid, concluded, after having paid Enid the 
$S,OOO.OO: "Well, based on my relationship with Enid, it would be 
4 -
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my opinion that she has no. interest in the estate." (T.85: Pg.14, 
lines 15-17.) 
The plaintiff is an experienced and seasoned "land-title" 
expert, who earns his living examining title to property in order 
to primarily determine and trace owner.ship of mineral rights. 
Based on his testimony, he does such_~~ork both personally and for 
cither persons or companies. During 197 3, while researching in 
this'''.:' manner, the plaintiff ran across the "no. __ tice of interest" 
which Enid had caused to be recorded on or about November 21, 
1969. At th _at t i me , - he contacted .:-~ n id and offered to purchase 
her interest, but was rebuffed with s~lence. On or· ab-out 
necember 3, 1 9 7 5 , by means not made c' le· a r at the tr i a 1 , the 
plaintiff again made contact with Enid and consummated the 
purchase of whatever,~nterest Enid then had in decedent's estate 
by means of a Quit Claim Deed for the sum of $2,000.00. 
Plaintiff admitted that he had never attempted to get the final 
Order of Distribution amended. (T.113) 
During 1976, plaintiff made demand upon the defendants for a 
one-seventh ( 1/7) - i_nterest in an:df-·-to the estate of decedent. 
This was re·j,ected. The defendant Dee Christensen then prepared 
and filed an affidavit (Exhibit 5) claiming the lack of mental 
ability or capacity to have executed the assignment on the date 
in question. Thereafter this litigation was commenced. 
- 5 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE QUIT 
CLAIM DEED FROM ENID (CHRISTENSEN) KOLARICH 
TO THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT CREATE AN INTEREST 
WHICH PLAINTIFF COULD QUIET TITLE TO. 
A. AN ASSIGNEE STANDS IN THE SAME POSITION AS HIS ASSIGNOR. 
This principle of law is so elementary and fundamental to 
American jurisprude_nce ,· · that it scarcely needs repeating. An 
assignee can obtain nothing more and is subject to the same 
defenses, offsets, etc., as his assignor is or was subject to. 
As a general rule, a valid and unqualified assignment 
operates to transfer to the assignee all the right, 
title, or interest of the assignor in the thing 
assigned, but not to confer upon the assignee any 
greater right or interest than that possessed by the 
assignor. 6 ~~~~' ~~~J_.9:..nm~~~ §82, pp. 1136-1137. 
As a general rule, unless the assignment is invalid so 
that no rights against the debtor are transferred 
thereby, an assignee acquires all the rights possessed 
by the assignor against the debtor at the time of the 
a s s i g nm en t , an d no mo r e • 6 f_~~_§-~ , As s i g nm en ts § 1 0 0 , 
p.1156. 
As the assignee acquires against the debtor only the 
rights which were possessed by the assignor (see supra 
§ 100), the debtor may assert against the assignee any 
1 i mi t a t ion s or ob j e ct ion s to which the c 1 aim a s s i g n e d ---
would have been subject in the hands of the assignor 
{ 5 e e infra § 1 1 4) • 6 f_~~~_§_._, ~~_!_g_n~~E.!--2. § 1 1 3, p. 116 4 •. 
A cause of action which is assigned is generally 
subject to any right of recoupment, set-off, cross 
demand or counterclaim, as well as being generally 
subject to any right of compensation held by the 
obliger against the assignor before and at the time of 
the assignment or notice thereof, and this rule 
lies although the assignor is bankrupt. In respect 
app ' d · · 1 h of such claims, the assignee or inari Y as no greater 
rights than the assignor, and the obliger is not by 
- 6 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reason of the ~ssignment put in a 
if the action ~ere by the assignor. 
an d Co_ u n t ~_!' c 1 ~_}-~· ·§ 5 4 a , pp • 9 8 - 9 9 • 
worse position than 
8 Q £_:_':!__=.3_._ t Se t :.9.!.i. 
Thus, no matter what consideration the assignee may pay to 
the assignor, that cons idera ti on ·cannot _give the assignee any 
better position or right a~ainst a third person or party than the 
assignor had. 
1980). These generai principles of law were applied by the Utah 
Court as follows: 
An assignment merely sets over or transfers the 
interest of one party in certain property to another. 
Such an assignment does not have the effect of 
can c e 11 in g a._n y r i g ht s . w hi ch other per sons have in 
connection with such property.· TanE~r v. L~~];~_E., 6 
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, 885, ( 1957). 
See also C~en!:.Y._ -:!.._:_ R':!_~}5~_£, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963). 
B. PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR WAS BARRED FROM ASSERTING ANY CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE OF MARION H. CHRISTENSEN, AND THUS PLAINTIFF 
WAS ALSO BARRED. 
The trial c·ourt m·ade detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion"s of Law. Briefly stated the relevant ones are as 
follows: 
A • On Ju 1 y 2 2 , 1 9 6 8 , th e de f en d ant De e 
Christensen was without sufficient mental capacity to 
make a valid assignment of anything. (T. 71) 
B. on July 22, 1968,_ .. the defendant Dee 
Christensen had no power to direct the executor of the 
estate of Marion H. Christensen's Estate to do anything 
but comply with the order of July 7, 1968, ·regarding 
the distribution of the Estate. (T. 72) 
c. Any claim of Enid Christensen [Kolarich] or 
the ~laintiff, to any interest in the estate of Marion 
h. Christensen, had to be pursued in Probate No. 1209. 
(T. 74) 
o. Any claim of Enid's was barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. (T 74) 
- 7 -
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The trial court thus specifically found that there were several 
bars to Enid's claim, which defendants could assert against the 
plaintiff, i.e., the lack of capacity of Dee Christensen to have 
made the assignment; the failure to pursue the terms of the 
assignment; etc. 
Appellant makes much of the fact that in Wyoming a patient 
must be "specifically adjudicated incompetent" before he is 
legally incompetent to "dispose of property, execute 
instruments. citing, Wyoming Statute, 1977 25-3-124(d). 
Defendants point out that the 1977 law plaintiff relies on is 
eight _ ( 8 ) years after th e !~-9_1:. , and therefore not applicable to 
July 22, 1969. Furthermore, as is pointed out in the Statement 
of Facts, in Exhibit P-5 the Wyoming court in its order of 
Involuntary Commitment found that on July 22, 196 9, Dee E. 
Christensen " lacks sufficient capacity to make responsible 
decisions. II Thus, the argument raised by appellant is 
without merit for two ( 2 ) reasons. First, the law is not 
applicable, and second, even if applicable, it does not serve 
plaintiff any useful purpose under this factual situation since 
both our court and the Wyoming court specifically made the 
finding that Dee E • Christensen cou~d not make responsible 
decisions on the day in question. 
Notwithstanding, the above, and even if either of the courts 
had not found the above recited facts and had not reached the 
relevant conclusions, it was and still is obvious from the 
before th e court that plaintiff's claim was nevertheless evidence 
- 8 -
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barred because it had been fully satisfied, and/or, the running 
of the Statute of Limitations. The trial court found that the 
heirs of the ·de-cedent had divided the estate in such a manner so 
tha-t each of the seven ;. { 7) living children received their 
prop or t ion ate ··one - s event h ( 1 / 7 ) of decedent ' s re a 1 and miner a 1 
properties. In 1970 the defendant De:e, ::christensen received. as· 
his proportionate share, an 8 0 acre parcel, which "in March or 
April, 1971, tha said Enid Christensen Kolarich did join with the 
defendant Dee E. Christensen in the sale of his 1/7 interest in 
the rea 1 property. he inherited from said estate, to. ba vi d Sam and 
his brothers." (Findings of Fact, No., 13, T.73). As indicated 
above , it w a s the opinion of Ju d'g e Sam"'· that the $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ' En i d . 
then demanded was for any interest that she claimed in the estate 
of decedent (T.85: Pg. 6, line 23 thru Pg. 7, line 2; Pg. 12, 
lines 5-19; and Pg. 13, lines 9-12), and he concluded, "based on 
my r~l~tionship with Enid it would be my opinion that she has no 
interest in the estate." (T.85: Pg.14, lines 15-17). 
Thus with out any of the ··other findings by the tr ia 1 court, 
the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing his claim, because 
all rights of Enid to the estate had been satisfied when she 
joined with Dee E. Christensen in the sale of Dee's 1/7 interest 
to Judge Sam. 
that sale. Enid, got all she expect.ed out of the estate. Her 
tacit approval and acceptance of the division of the estate made 
by all of the heirs, barred her and/or her assignee from any 
r~ght to demand any add~tional part of decedent's estate. 
- 9 -
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Furthermore, the trial court found plaintiff's claim to be 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. Any interest the plaintiff 
might have in the real property and mineral rights of decedent's 
estate, arose by reason of the written instrument from Dee 
Christensen to Enid, dated July 22, 1969. All of Enid's "Notices 
of Interest," etc., were founded on the assignment from Dee, and 
the validity or applicability of said notices must rise or fall 
with that original assignment. The statute that apparently has 
application to this situation, is Title 78-12-23, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, which requires that any claim founded on an 
instrument in writing must be. commenced "within six years." The 
assignment, an instrument in writing, was given July 22, 1969, 
and plaintiff's action was commenced July 19, 1976, almost seven 
( 7) years later. The Assignment from Dee directed the "Probate 
Court of Duchesne County, Utah, to distribute to ENID 
CHRISTENSEN. all of my said interest in said estate." 
Neither Enid nor the plaintiff made an attempt to get the probate 
court or the executor to do anything. The executor was under an 
order of the Probate Court from and after July 1, 1969, to do 
certain acts. The executor could not vary from the court's order 
so as to comply with Enid's assignment, without leave of court. 
Neither plaintiff nor Enid sought to modify, appeal or stay the 
order of the trial court within the one ( 1) month required by 
Rule 73, U.R.C.P. Thus, by September 4, 1969, the Decree of 
Distribution had become binding upon the executor and all of the 
heirs. Title was then conveyed to the heirs and they were free 
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to divide the inherited pro~erty in any manner they chose. All 
of decedent's heirs aqreed to··a fair and equitable partitionment 
prior to July 1, 
effect in 1970. 
1969, which partitionment the heirs put into 
In 1970, Dee Christensen received all that he 
was entitled to from decedent's estate. Enid recieved all she 
claimed she was entitled to in 197 1 when she joined Dee 
Christensen in selling Dee's share to Judge Sam. The plaintiff 
n either den i e d that the div is ion b e0b~w·e en the seven ( 7 ) chi 1 d re n 
was equitable, nor alleged that it was unfair or an attempt to 
defraud anyone. The plaintiff did not produce his assignor as a 
w i.t n e s s to rebut any of the def en s e s r a i s e d by the defendants • 
The defe'nses thus raised by the defendants remained ... unchallenged 
before the Court, and were believed and adopted as findings by 
the trial court. 
In passing, while appellant correctly states the general 
rule that from and after the death of the decedent the title to 
any property .the decedent was possessed of "immediately passed to 
and vested in her [his] heirs, subject to administration and 
payment of debts " c it in g Ch a !Eber 1 _!_!l_,_ ~ a l_~ ~- La _E_~~E.L e ~ _a l_._, 8 3 
Utah 4 2 0, 29 p. 2 d 355 (1934), appellant's reasoning and 
application of the general rule is not wholly correct. Even if 
the assignment of July 22, 1969, was originally valid, it was 
designed to serve as directions in a probate proceedings only, 
and it r eque ste d or directed the Probate Court [executor] to do 
certain acts, none of which Enid or plaintiff attempted to have 
the probate Court [executor] perform· Thus, under the court 
11 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order, title to the subject property vested in the seven ( 7) 
children of the decedent, including Dee Christensen. Those seven. 
(7) children could and did d~vide the property in the m~nner they 
felt was fair. Dee, and thus Enid, received all he or she was 
entitled to. Plaintiff cannot now be heard to say that he is 
still entitled to one-seventh ( 1/7) of what the other six (6) 
children received. To follow plaintiff's wishes, then Enid, 
after being satisfied from Dee's one-seventh ( 1/7) as to any 
claim, moral or otherwise she had on decedent's estate, can ~ake 
an assignment to plaintiff, and plaintiff would get one-seventh 
( 1/7) of what the other six (6) children received. That is not 
fair or equitable. As defendants would be able to raise defenses 
to Enid if she made such a claim, then under law governing 
assignments the defendants can raise the same defenses against 
plaintiff. 
Respondents thus conclude that there was no error on the 
part of the trial court in barring the claims of the appellant. 
The quit-claim deed from Enid to plaintiff was subject to all the 
defens~s the defendants had against Dee Christensep and/or Enid. 
The pl a in tiff cannot stand in a be.t ter position than En id did. 
The trial court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT DO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL. 
The plaintiff assigns error to paragraphs 4B, 5 and 6, of 
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the Findings of Fact which deal with the incompetency of Dee 
Christensen on July 2 2, 1969. Defendants previously responded to 
that issue by pointing out 1 that the statute p~aintiff now relies 
on is a 1977 version of the Wyoming law. Plaintiff does not cite 
the 1 9 6 9 1 aw in Wyoming , nor di d I?.l a inti f f c it e any r elev ant 
statute at the -time of the trial. The Trial Court gave "full 
faith and c red it '' to the Ju 1 y 2 2 , 1 9 6 9 , pronouncement of the 
Wyoming Court. 
·The - plaintiff in traduced n~~~in_9-, .. to negate the 
same, except for repeated refe£ences to the fact~~that Dee 
Christensen was committed for chronic alcoholism. Whether that 
is true or not has no· ·relevance on the findings of the Wyoming 
and Utah courts. What was before the trial court was a Wyoming 
order that made it clear that on July 22, 1969, Dee Christensen 
lacked "sufficient capacity to make responsible decisions. 
Dee Christensen was . not just admitted to the Wyoming State 
Hospital, but he was }nv~lun_!_~£~l.X committed. (See Exhibit P-5). 
Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 7, 9, 17 and 18, of the 
Findings of Fact by alleging that Enid did all that she had to do 
by filing the assignment with the Clerk ofvthe Cou~t on August 1, 
1969, and recording a Notice of Interest with the County Recorder 
on November 21, 1969. A careful reading of the Assignment makes 
it clear that Enid 22.~.Y~..E. attempt~_d to do what the assignment 
required, i..e., to direct the Probate Court [executor] to do 
certain acts. Nothing in the assignment required the filing of 
the Notice of Interest on November 21, 1969. That notice was an 
unnecessary and legally meanLngless act. The decedent's executor 
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proceeded to act in the manner he was autho ... rized in op·en court on ·~·-· .. 
July 1, 1969, to do, namely to distribute the decedent's estate 
to the heirs. If Enid had petitioned the Pr6bate Court or the 
executor for a 6hange in the ordei, ih~n-that could have properly 
been considered by the Probate Court in 1969. However, since 
Enid allowed th~ Statute of Limita~ions to run, then plaintiff is 
barred both by Enid's inaction and the other defenses raised by 
the defendants. The trial court had all of the evidence before_ 
it, and in considering the same, made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Plaintiff does not allege that the court 
abused its discretion, and the trial court's Findings should be 
granted the usual and customary presumption of correctness on 
appeal. (See R.C. Tolman Const. 
-------- --------
Co .. v .. 563 
p. 2 d 780 (Utah, 1977); First Bank v. 
Wri_ght, 521 P.2d 563 (Utah, 1974). 
Finally, plaintiff objects to paragraph 12 on the basis that 
Enid was not a party to any family agreement .. It is true that 
Enid did not enter into the family agreement. 
However, it is clear that Enid was aware of and consented to the 
division at least when she joined with Dee in selling his one-
seventh ( 1/7) of the decedent's estate to Judge Sam .. Neither 
Enid nor Dee shared those proceeds with any of the other heirs of 
the estate. In Judge Sam's opinion, based on his relationship 
with En id, Enid did not feel she had any more interest in 
decedent's estate. Perhaps that is why Enid rebuffed plaintiff 
so quickly in 1973, and why plaintiff could purchase all of 
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Enid's claim for only $2,000.00 in 1975. She knew she had 
nothing coming, but if some "sucker" wanted to pay her for 
nothing, he could. Perhaps that is why plaintiff chose not to 
call Enid as a witness at the trial. 
_,To give plaintiff one-
seventh (1/71 of the remaining six-~~venths (6/7) of the estate, 
for onl~ $2,0DO.OO is unconscionable and unfair. 
As a final argument, defendants point out that this matter 
was tried on July 12, 1978. The Judge issued his memorandum 
On O c to be r 2·2 , 1 9 7 8 , de fen a ants ' decision on September 21, 1978. 
counsel prepared and sent to plaintiff's counsel for approval as 
to form, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment, which plaintiff's couns.el was to send on to the court 
for signature and filing. P I a i ri t i f f ' s c o u n s e 1 r e t a i n e d s a i d. 
Findings, 
defendants' 
plaintiff's 
etc., until September, 1979 ,- without advising 
counsel of anything. Finally, in September, 1979, 
counsel informed defendants' counsel of several 
objections to the Findings, etc. Because of the inordinate 
delay, defendants' counsel then submitted the Findings, etc., to 
the tri'al' court without approval as to form for signature and 
filing. However, from and after October, 1978, through November, 
1979, plaintiff never requested the trial court· to alter, amend 
or reconsider its Findings of Fact, etc. Now on appeal, 
plaintiff attacks the Findings as not conforming to the evidence. 
Defendants suggest that the proper place to have first raised the 
issue would have been in the trial court, immediately following 
the trial. There is evidence to support all of the Findings, 
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etc., of the trial court, and this court should now affirm the 
same. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the lower court should be affirmed in its 
entirety. The simple fact is that plaintiff received nothing 
from Enid that he can quiet title to. On December 3, 1975, Enid 
h a d n o th i n g to a s s i g n t o th e p 1 a int i f f and p 1 a int i:f f, rec e iv e d 
just that. While the trial court found the assignment to have 
been invalid to begin with, even if it was originally valid, 
since the terms of the Assignment were never complied with and 
cctnnot now be complied with, the assignment was and is 
unenforceable; or even if Enid or plaintiff had complied with all 
of tLe ter~s. of th e ,°''. s s i. g nm e n t , since, Enid joined in the 
tran:;:ac:tion with Dee to sell to Judge Sam, then the Assignment 
-,,,Ta ~- f u 11 y p e r form e d ; a n d f in a 1 1 y , even i f the As s i ·;nm en t was not 
satisfied by performance, all of the rights under the Assignment 
were harred by the Statute of Limitations from and after July 22, 
197 5. 
Respectfully submitt0d this day of June, 1980. 
~GAN & GILLESPIE ----~~ f .J_],~61~~~=-----
GE 0 RGE ~MANGAN \j 
'CHRISTENSEN~TAYL~ODY 
~o-~~~-~§:li~~-----------R 0 B E RT L • M 0 0 DY _<::_--:::-t 
16 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the di.rd day of June, 1980, I mailed 
a true copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, to John 
C. Beaslin, Attorney for Appellant, 185 North Vernal Avenue, # 1, 
Vernal, Utah 84078, postage prepaid. 
I 2 ·~ Ylw1.LL __ :t5t!filat~---------
s e c re tar y 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
